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1. Intl'oduction 
May 1995 
Give me afulcrum and 1 \Vill move the \Vorld. 
Archimedes 
1t is often said or implied that the }¡ollse\Vije ... 
is actuated by a dijferent set of motives 
in her eco/lomic transactions in the market 
and her Ilon-eco/lomic tra/lsactions at home; 
but this is o.bviollsly not so. 
Philip Wicksteed 
A simple glance at any of his papers makes it apparent that Becker' s 
contributions to economics are anything but conventional. Gary Becker is 
without a doubt the leading figure in nonconventional economics. This volume 
contains a selection of Becker's papers which are considered representative of 
his approach to economics. 
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The papers selected in this book can be grouped under two broad headings: 
foundations of human behavior (Part 1) and applications (Parts II to V). Part 1 
consists of nine papers through which the reader gains access to the basics of 
Becker's approach to human behavior: fundamental premises, the time allocation 
problem, the concept of human capital, social interactions and preferences 
characterization. Parts n, m, IV and V comprise sixteen papers devoted (in this 
order) to family, marriage and fertility, discrimination, law, politics and macro 
behavior. AII but one of these papers are examples of Becker's well-known 
unorthodox applications of economic theory. The exception is reading 22 (Part 
V), one of the quite rare cases of Becker's orthodox use of economic tools (in the 
area of monetary economics). The volume ends with Part VI where the reader can 
find Becker's personal survey of his own contributions. 
The inflationary process economics bibliography has been undergoing in the 
last two decades would by itself justify the appearance of this volume. Let us just 
sketch two additional reasons. Firstly, no single collection of Becker's papers is 
presently available. Thus any information-gathering devise such as this book may 
have a market. Secondly, is there any better reason than taking occasion of a 
Nobel Prize to promote the diffusion of worthwhile ideas? 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 offers an abbreviated 
account of Becker's intellectual biography. Section 3 presents a brief guide to 
the fundamental contributions Becker has made to economics. In each of the 
topics chosen we will try to underline the key concepts and their principal 
implications. After reviewing, in subsection 3.1, what we call Becker's first 
principIes, we devote subsections 3.2 to 3.4 to the analysis of three peculiar types 
of inputs: time, human assets and children. Then, in subsections 3.5 and 3.6 we 
deal with two important examples of social interaction: marriage and divorce, and 
discrimination. The last subsection, 3.7, is concerned with a singular kind of labor 
supply problem: criminal behavior. In Section 4, we concisely discuss the meaning 
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of economics in the light of Becker's work. Section 5 suggests sorne conc1usions. 
An extensive bibliography of this work, containing aH his books and main artic1es, 
is provided in the Appendix. 
FinaHy, we would remind readers that this paper is not intended to be an 
account of each and every contribution Gary Becker has made to economics. The 
following pages are not so much a survey of Becker's economics as an invitation 
to read Becker's literature (at least an invitation to read the twenty-six papers 
selected in this volume). 
2. Intellectual Biography 
In presenting this selection of Prof. Gary Becker's scientific papers we wish 
to help the student of modern economics to know, criticize and extende the 
unconventional ideas developed in them. We also want to honor one of the most 
original economists of the 20th century, who has contributed to widening the 
scope of economics, to the point of being descried as an empire builder! Bis 
originality was precisely one of the reasons cited by the Swedish Academy for 
awarding him,the Nobel Prize for Economic Science in 1992. 
His approach has consisted in lifting so me assumptions taken for granted in 
most microeconomic modeling, such as given tastes, homogeneous labor, risk 
neutrality, households as a one person consumption unit; and, with this minimal 
deepening in the level of explanation, apply standard neoc1assical cost and utility 
theory in order to throw new light on previously unconnected and badly 
understood social phenomena. By using Ockam 's razor to cut away ancillary 
assumptions, he reduces his axioms to one, that all actors in the social game are 
homines ecollomici, economic persons, rational agents who maximize their 
advantages in differen! cost situations. Inductivists would no! believe it, but, by 
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placing his models on this minimal unrealistic fulcrum, he shifts huge problems 
that other social scientists found immovable. 
For normal science economics, Becker's hunting ground is unconventional 
(or rather, thanks to him, was). His minimal assumption starting point has allowed 
him to study persistent racial and sexual discrimination in labor markets; 
investment in human capital; crime and punishment; marriage, divorce, the 
quantity and quality of children; drug addiction; and other apparently 
, 
noneconomic dimensions of society. In just recognition of the breadth of his 
research he is a University Professor at the University of Chicago in both the 
Departments of Economics and of Sociology. 
Whatever the opinion that the reader may form of Becker's explanations, 
there is a test by which Becker will allow himself to be judged: empirical 
refutation (see Becker, Grossman, Kevin and Murphy, 1994). He is well within the 
tradition of the older Chicago School, as represented by his friends and masters 
Milton Friedman and George Stigler (on both of whom he has written), that holds 
mere theorizing to be insufficient and is ready to stand or fall by the ability of 
positive theory to solve empirical problems. Anybody in disagreement with 
Beckcr should try to convince him of error by testing his assumption shift with 
economic laboratory experiments, and his conclusions wilh statistical 
observations. But, by making it his specialty to question the assumptions of 
standard ll1icroeconoll1ic theory, Becker has gone a step further than Friedll1an: 
for Becker the standard assull1ptions of neoclassical economics can also be 
challenged ell1pirically! 
Gary Stanley Becker was born in Pottsville, Pennsylvania, in 1930. He 
graduated at Princeton University in 1951 and obtained his Master and Ph.D. 
degrees at the University of Chicago, the spirit and tradition of whose 
Departll1ent of Econoll1ics left an indelible ll1ark on him. 
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After holding an Assistant Professorship at Chicago, he moved to Columbia 
University in 1957, where he was made Professor of Economics in 1960. He 
returned to Chicago as a one year Ford Foundation Visiting Professor of 
Economics and George Stigler persuaded him to stay. This was a shrewd move by 
a keen talent spotter: Becker became the fifth Chicago Nobel Prize winner in 
Economics. 
Much of his mature thought can be conveniently found in his books, which, 
uncharacteristically for the profession, are as important as his articles. But the 
articles themselves are sometimes indispensable and often illuminating, which 
explains the need for the present collection. 
After a few articles on macroeconomics and monetary theory, Becker 
published his reworked doctoral thesis. Titled The Economics o/ Discrimination 
(Becker, 1957), it went unnoticed for a time, perhaps because the problem he 
addressed was still not quite in the news. In this work he tried to square the 
competitive model of labor markets with observed persistent color and sex 
differences in wages, by inlroducing a "taste" for discrimination in the utility 
function of employers and employees. He thus slarted to dig below the 
assumption of identical preferences in market actors. 
The second book Human Capital (Becker, 1964) again broke new ground. 
This was a study of the formation of human capital by schooling, on-the-job 
learning, and labor training. This was a theory of differences in personal 
distribution of income, which had been adumbrated by Richard Cantillon and 
Adam Smith but was abandoned for nearly two centuries, with the exception 
perhaps of Ihe labor market economist Jacob Mincer. In this case Becker's new 
idea was an immediate success and sparked off a spate of studies in the 
productivity of education, in Ihe causes of underdevelopment, in wage 
differentials, and connected fields such as unemployment. 
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Becker was again innovative in considering time as a scarce resource 
constraining individual utility functions. In his article, HA Theory of the 
AlIocation of Time" (Becker, 1965) and in a book he wrote with Gilbert Ghez, 
entitled The Allocation of Time and Goods over the Life Cycle (Ghez and 
Becker, 1974), he applied the view of time as a scarce input in production to 
modeling the family; and much later, to modeling destructive and constructive 
addiction (such as addiction to c1assical music and sport, or to drugs and alcohol). 
His fourth fruitful idea was to treat delinquents as rational persons, who 
calculate the utility of rewards and costs of their peculiar caUing, but who have a 
positive risk preference and discount the future. This "positivistic" view of crime 
had been explored initially by Jeremy Bentham in the late 18th and early 19th 
century but then abandoned even by Bentham himself for a "normative" 
conception of crime and punishment. Becker had published an article called 
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach" (Becker, 1968). Later he 
edited a collection of Essays in Ihe Ecollomics of Crime and Punishmenl 
(Becker and Landes, 1974). Many other allthors have researched in the sociology 
of crime following his suggestion that the criminal calculates the expected 
benefits and costs of crime. 
Becker returned to parents and children in his Trealise 011 the Family 
(Becker, 1981a), a topic he had previously approached in a number of articles. In 
his Treatise, after Iifting the standard assumption that the family was a one person 
consumption unit, he tried to explain cooperative behavior within the family, on 
the basis of the utility functions of its members. He even accommodated altruistic 
behavior by selfish family members with his famolls "Rotten Kid Theorem". The 
family was modeled as a multiperson production unit, as a "factory", he Iikes to 
say to shock sociologists. The family produces joint utility, the inputs being the 
time, skills and knowledge of its different members. It is thus that he approaches 
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one of the most intractable economic conundrums: "Altruism in the Family and 
Selfishness in the Marketplace", as he entitled a later article (Becker, 1981b). 
Becker has used the theory of the family to predict the choice of spouse, the 
increased frequency of divorce with female occupation in the market, and other 
outlandish phenomena as monogamy and polygamy. He even has addressed the 
historical question of "Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of Families" (Becker 
and Tomes, 1986). 
His economic theory of the family also allowed Becker to rework and 
overturn the theory of population. For nearly two centuries economists had held 
that Malthus's theory of population (Malthus, 1798) was a fruitful hypothesis but 
that it was contradicted by fac!. The escape hatch had traditionally be en through 
normative preaching, telling peopre not to fall into the Malthusian trap and 
patting each other on the back for having be en such successful neo-Malthusians. 
With his economics of the family Becker was able to model parental choice in the 
matter of offspring: the choice between quantity and quality of children when 
wealth increases; the effect one parent families, of divorce, of female employment, 
on family size; the repercussions on children of the educational level of the 
mother. 
Becker has al so shown sorne interest, deri ved perhaps from his studies of the 
labor market and union restrictions on entry (Becker, 1959), in public policy and 
pressure groups. But his latest unsettling move has been his attempt to model the 
formation of tastes. In an earlier article with George Stigler, "De Gustibus Non Est 
Disputandum" (Stigler and Becker, 1977), he had unyieldingly held the 
neoclassical ground that questioning preferences and utility maximization was 
not the way to solve social problems and that as much mileage as possible should 
be extracted from the structure of costs in each concrete case. In later years, 
however, and with the help of human capital theory and time scarcity, he has 
been able to model taste formation, constructive and destructive addiction, 
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advertising as a good and abad; and he has even forayed into the direct relation 
between price and tines, and demando 
Again he has modeled the addict as a rational being. A person may be rational 
and unhappy, pace Bentham, if her 01' his time and risk preference lead to 
acquiring an "addiction capital", which, tike any capital, decays over time. He 
uses this capital, combined with a diminishing yield to increments in the 
consumption of the addictive "bad", to explain unwelcome continued addiction, 
as well as "binges" when the addiction has been suspended for a while. (See 
Becker and Murphy, 1988). 
Conversely, constructive addictions, such as the enjoyment of classical music 
01' art, 01' of jogging 01' tennis, are again explained by Ihe conlribution of current 
consumption lo Ihe accumulation 01' resloring of an "addiclion capital". These 
are constructive because they have as a joint product the accumulation 01' 
restoration of other kinds of wanted human capital, such as pleasurable social 
intercourse 01' the maintenance of health. 
Finally, we cannot conclude this seclion without menlioning his Economic 
Approach lo Human Behavior (1976). In Ihe inlroduclory chapler of Ihal book, 
Beckcr emphasizes what he considers lo be Ihe fundamenlal premis~s of Ihe 
economic approach lo human behavior: maximizing behavior, slable preferences 
and markel equilibrium (see Seclion 4.1). 
3. The Economics of Gary Becker: A Brief Guide 
3.1 First PrincipIes 
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Things are not what they appear to be. First impressions can be quite 
misleading where the explanation of human behavior is concerned. This, we may 
well say, is the advice implicitly given by Becker to economists (and to 
noneconomists). 
Many activities performed by individuals or families are not what they seem 
to be. Sorne economic activities traditionally interpreted as pure consumption 
actions are really something else. A family outing to a restaurant or the reading of 
a good book are good examples. For Becker they are not simply consumption 
activities. A deeper look at them reveals they are instead production of 
sustenance and investment in vocabulary activities, respectively. These activities 
cannot therefore be understood in the light of traditional consumption theory. A 
re/ormulation o/ the economic theory o/ household behavior is needed. The 
nelV approach must bring production and investment theories into 
consumption theory. This is in fact one of Becker's central contributions to 
economics (see Part 1 of selected readings, in particular Chapters 3 and 4). 
Two ideas are fundamental to Becker's new household economic theory. The 
first one refers to time. Time is now a scarce factor input (also used in the 
production of nonmarket goods); it is indeed the household's primary scarce 
resource. Time is also a new restriction for household behavior; what agents have 
to solve is a more complex time allocation problem than the one involved in the 
textbook trade-off between leisure and work. The second idea is concerned with 
human assets. People can be seen as assets or durables. Em bodied in oursel ves is 
our human capital. 
On the other hand many activities thought to be noneconomic in nature (by 
both the general public and the profession itself) are actually economic problems. 
Economic theory can be of great help in the explanation of phenomena 
traditionally located outside the scope of economics and studied by specialists in 
the areas of law, sociology, biology, political science and anthropology. 
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Exercising racial discrimination, choosing the number of children, entering the 
political arena or behaving as criminals is just a short list of the many possible 
examples. Economic theory can shed light on the comprehension of these 
phenomena. 
There is no reason why the economist shollld not extend the frontiers o/ 
economics alld apply the tools o/ ecollomic theory to the long neglected sphere 
o/ nOllfllarket activities. The development of this economic imperialism (see 
Parts n, III, IV and V of selected readings), especiaIly in the areas of marriage and 
fertility, discrimination, and criminal behavior is another significant contribution 
that Becker has made to modern economics. 
What then is the nove\ty of Becker's contributions? The originality of 
Becker's economics does not reside in the tools employed. It is in the applications 
where Becker's creativity lies. By using standard (and mercifully 
nonsophisticated) economic tools Becker has widened the range of applications 
of economics. In Becker's words, what is new is not the starting poin! but where 
someone goes with the analysis. 
In what foIlows we wiII se\ect a smaIl but, we think, representative sample of 
Becker's contributions. In each of the topics chosen we wiII try to underline the 
key concepts and their main implications. Subsections 3.2 to 3.4 are devoted to 
the analysis of three peculiar types of inputs: time, human assets and children. 
Subsections 3.5· and 3.6 treat two important examples of social interaction: 
marriage and divorce, and discrimination. FinaIly, Subsection 3.7 is related to a 
singular kind of labor supply problem: criminal behavior. 




Since Adam Smith's lVeallh 01 Nations consumption is regarded as the final 
stage of the economic process. The ultimate goal of economic activity is the 
maximization of utility by consumers. In conventional economic theory the 
arguments of utility functions are the quantities of nondurable market goods and 
services (including those provided by durable market goods) purchased by 
agents. No further transformation of these goods is needed for consumers to 
derive utility. In formal terms, households were traditionally assumed to maximize 
U=U(xp ... ,xm ) 
where U is a well-behaved utility function, and x; represents the ith market good 
purchased by the household. 
In this respect, Becker's approach to consumption theory (Becker, 1965; 
Michael and Becker, 1973) represents an important departure from conventional 
theory. The nelV theory introduces a new category of goods, basic goods, as the 
arguments of the utility functions of consumers (L e., as the only utility-yielding 
goods). Basic goods are goods not purchased or sold in the market place. They 
are instead produced by consumers (for a given state of household technology), 
using both market purchased goods and time as factor inputs. Now households 
derive utility from market goods only in an indirect way. Basic goods exhibit also 
another unconventional characteristic, they have no explicit prices, since there 
are no explicit markets for them. This fact, however, represents no impediment to 
the development of an operative theory of household behavior, since shadolV 
prices (Le., prices based on home production costs) can always be assigned to 
basic goods. The new approach to the study of household behavior implies, then, 
the maximization of the utility function 
where Z; is the basic good i that the household produces via the well-behaved 
production function 
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~ =Zi(X"ti ), i=l, ... ,m 
where X, is a vector of market goods and ti is a vector of time inputs used in 
producing the ¡th basic good. 
A familiar example of a basic good is sleeping, which can be seen as the 
output of a production pro ces s where a bed, a house, sorne amount of time and, 
maybe, soft music, lullabies or pills, are used as inputs, and combined via a 
production function. Households (individuals or families) are then regarded as 
production units or small factories. Now, not only firms, (conventional theory) but 
also households, produce goods and services. Although firms produce market 
goods, the production of those goods that directly en ter consumers' utility 
functions is under the control of households. Households, then, must make two 
kinds of decisions: how to produce at the minimum cost and how to consume at 
the maximum utili ty leve!. The Ilousellold production tlleory points out, needless 
to say, that the relevant measure of global production of an economy is far from 
being the one estimated by national accounting standards. 
Having said all that, a natural question follows. Why are not market goods 
final goods? What makes them intermediate goods from the point of view of 
households? Time is the answer. Consuming market goods takes time. In spite of 
being obvious for economists and noneconomists, this simple fact has been 
ignored by traditional economic theory. Time is an input in both market activities 
(labor market) and nonmarket (home) activities. Washing up at home or going to 
the movies are, for example, two cases of common activities requiring time and 
market goods as factor inputs. 
As economists like to say, tllere is no sllch a thing as a free lunch. Time is no 
exception in that it is an input in fixed supply. One immediate implication of all 
this is that time has a price, an explicit price in market activities and a shadow 
price (approximated by the market wage rate) in nonmarket activities. Another 
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implication is that time, in itself, represents a restriction for consumers, Le., a new 
restriction in addition to the conventional budget constraint. The new time 
restriction makes clear that time not spent working in the labor market is not 
leisure, as traditional theory suggests, but time spent in nonmarket activities (Le., 
time spent producing basic goods). The need to consider both restrictions led 
Becker to define a new scale variable in the utility maximization problem that 
households are supposed to sol ve. It is now ¡uU ¡ncome (Le., the maximum money 
income a household can achieve when deyoting all the time and other reSOUl'ces 
to earning income), that is the relevant resource constraint that limits household 
choices. 
The fact that time is mone)' (Le., it has a positive price) is equivalent to saying 
that the relevant price of a good is n.ot its market price. Several factors determine 
the ¡l/ll 01' effective price of a good. Full prices depend on the price of time, the 
time and market goods intensities, the price of market goods, and the state of 
household technology. Differences in these factors will originate differences in 
the effective price of the same good. This brings us to a striking conclusion. Two 
different consumers do not pay (in general) the same price for the same good 
even if the market under consideration is perfectly competitive. Rather than a 
price, there is a distribution of prices associated with each good. ' 
It is also important to note that the price of time is not equal for everybody 
either. It changes, for example, through the week. For working persons, the 
opportunity cost of time is norll1ally lower at weekends than on working days. 
The price of time changes also with the level and composition of incoll1e. Thus 
time will be cheaper for a poor ll1an than for a rich one, for a woman (generally) 
than for aman, for a worker than for a rentier, 01' for an unemployed person rather 
than for a person with ajobo The importance of these conclusions for firms cannot 
be exaggerated. Firms can reduce the effective price of a given good without 
lowering its market price, by just offering more convenience to the consumero 
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They can either decrease the amount of time spent consuming that good (e.g., by 
offering free parking, quick service, etc.) or reduce the cost of time devoted to its 
purchase (e.g., by opening at weekends). These considerations al!ow us to define 
a new (fuI! income) budget constraint as 
i=l 
where Te, is thefull price of a unit of ;;; and S is the householdfull income. The 
fuI! price Te, is, in turn, defined as 
where p, and w are the prices of the market goods and of the time, respectively, 
used per unit of ;;;, and the coefficients a, and b, measure the goods and time 
intensity, respectively, of ;;; . 
A number of interesting conclusions can be derived from the comparative 
statics of Becker's model. One concerns the effects of a rise in wages. The first 
order conditions of the household problem show that for consumption to be 
optimal the marginal rate of substitution between any two basic goods should 
equal their fuI! price ratio, and that optimal production requires that the marginal 
rate of technical substitution between time and market goods be equal to their 
relative prices. Thus, unlike conventional theory, an increase in the wage rate 
now leads to two types of substitution effects. The first one is the conventional 
substitution effect away from time spent on nonmarket activities (leisure in the 
old fashion theory). This effect leads households to replace time by goods in the 
production of each basic good. The second type is the new substitution effect 
created by the changes in the relative fuI! prices (or relative marginal costs) of 
nonmarket activities that the increase in the wage rate normal!y induces. A rise in 
the wage rate increases the relative fuI! price of more time-intensive goods and 


























divorce, a political party, or a "life style" all involve the allocation of scarce 
resources among competing ends" (Michael and Becker, 1973). 
Regarding those decisions, Becker emphasizes the importance of aggregate 
behavior as compared to the behavior of microunits like firms and househols. 
Thus he claims (Becker, 1971, pp. 2), "our main interest, as is that of most 
economists, is in the market behavior of aggregations of firms and households; 
although important inferences are drawn about individual firms and households, 
we try mainly to understand aggregate responses to changes in basic economic 
parameters like tax rates, tariff schedules, technology, or anti trust provisions". 
As far as the scope of economics is concerned, this is fine. But, what can be 
said about the economic approach in itself? What are the distinctive features of 
the economic approach? In Becker's introductory chapter to his Economic 
Approach (1976, pp. 5) we find the answer: "the combined assumptions of 
maximizing behavior, market equilibrium, and stable preferences, used relentlessly 
and unflinchingly, form the heart of the economic approach as I see it". In recent 
years, Becker has progressed to modeling preferences, and thus the aboye phrase 
could be amended by a pedant to saying "functionally stable preferences" . 
• The assumption of maxilllizing or ralional behavior implies that agents 
behave as if they maximized their own utility functions subject to their budget 
constraint, time constraint and production constraints, which can all be combined 
into a single full incollle (or full wealth, in a dynamic model) budget constraint. 
The utility functions of households relate (in ordinal terms) households welfare to 
their consumption of basic goods (not of market goods), i,e., goods which are not 
putchased ·or sold, but produced by households, and whose prices (shadow 
prices) are determined by their production costs. Through the prices and incomes 
that enter their full income budget constraints, household behavior is restricted by 
lIlarket equilibria conditions, even if there are no explicit markets and prices 
(e.g., marriage markets). 
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For Becker, rational behavior is a broader concept than selfish behavior. This 
means that altruistic behavior can also be interpreted as a form of rational 
behavior. Becker expresses the altruistic behavior of person X with respect to Y 
by considering Y's utility as an argument of the utility function of X. Proceeding 
this way Y's welfare become a new basic good for X. It is precisely this device 
which enables Becker to solve the problem of aggregation of preferences in 
multiperson households and to define the decision-making problem of a 
household in'ierms of a single utility, the IlOusehold's or ¡ami/y 's utility function, 
the latter being the utility function of the "head" of the family. In his popular 
"Rotten Kid Theorem" Becker (1974) shows that, under certain conditions, if the 
head of a household is altruistic (and, therefore, incorporates in her or his utility 
function the utility functions of the other household members), all other 
household members, even if they are selfish (Le., they are only interested in 
maximizing their own individual utility functions), will nevertheless behave as if 
they were altruistic toward the family head, beca use that raises their own welfare. 
This implies that the household or family decision-making problem can be stated 
in terms of a single utility function, the one that represents the family head's 
preferences, and a single full income (or wealth) budget constraint, the one that 
delimits the possible uses of the joint income or wealth of the entire family. 
Altruism is not the only kind of human behavior that it is thought to threaten 
the validity of economic theory. It is al so normally argued that irrational behavior 
implies the rejection of standard economic predictions. Becker (1962) shows that 
economic theory is more compatible with irrational behavior than had been 
generally believed. Becker distinguishes between individual and market 
rationality. He proves that irrational consumers and firms would often be forced 
into rational market responses. Accordingly, the standard market demand 
(negatively sloped) and supply functions (positively sloped) can be derived even 
when households and firms behave irrationally. His analysis leads Becker to the 
astonishing conclusion that households and firms can be said to behave "as if' 
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they were rational, but al so "as ir' they were irrationa\. The explanation given by 
Becker relies on the role played by the scarcity principie in the aIlocation of 
resources, a principie general enough to inc\ude a wide c\ass of irrational behavior 
as weIl as rational behavior. 
The assumption of stable preferences serves as "a stable foundation for 
generating predictions about responses to various changes, and prevents the 
analyst from succumbing to the temptation of simply postulating the required 
shift in preferences to "explain" aIl apparent contradictions to his predictions" 
(Becker, 1976, pp. 5). For a correct understanding of the assumption of stable 
preferences we should not forget that basic goods, and not market goods, are the 
only utility-yielding goods. Accordingly, Becker's assumption about the stability 
of preferences refers to the stability of preferences with respect to basic goods 
such as health, prestige, sensual pleasure and so on. One should note that this 
kind of stability need not imply the stability of preferences with respect to market 
goods for, as Becker (1971) reminds us, basic goods do not always bear a stable 
relation to market goods and services. It is also of relevance for the proper 
understanding of the stability assumption lo observe that it should be interpreted 
in both cross-section and intertemporal terms. In other words, "tastes neither 
change capriciously nor differimportanlly between people" (Stigler and Becker, 
1977, pp. 76). 
The approach based on rational behavior and stable preferences differs 
greatly from the traditional economic approach. A comparative analysis of the 
two approaches is provided by Stigler and Becker (1977). "On the traditional 
view, an explanation of economic phenomena that reaches a difference in tastes 
between people or times is the terminus of the argument" (pp. 76). However, in 
Becker's (and Stigler's) approach "one never reaches this impasse, the economist 
continues to search for differences in prices or incomes to explain any differcnces 
or changes in behavior" (pp. 76). The new approach has "partIy translated 
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"unstable tastes" into variables in the household production functions for 
commodities. The great advantage, however, of relying only on changes in the 
arguments entering household production functions is that all changes in 
behavior are explained by changes in prices, and incomes, precisely the variables 
that organize and gi ve power to economic analysis" (pp. 89). In cone! usion, 
"when an apparently profitable opportunity to a firm, worker, or household is no! 
exploited, the economic approach does not take refuge in assertions abaut 
irrationality, contentment with wealth already acquired, or convenient ad hoc 
shifts in values (Le., preferences). Rather it postulates the existence of costs, 
monetary or psychic, of taking advantage of these opportunities that eliminates 
their profitability -costs that may not be easily seen by outside observers" 
(Becker, 1976, pp. 7). 
Finally we end this section with a brief remark on the nature of the 
assumptions of maximizing behavior and stable preferences. For Becker (1976b). 
the pastulates of maximizing behavior and stable preferences are not simply 
primitive assumptions. Behind them lies the principie of natural selection. These 
assumptions can be explained by the selection over time of traits having greater 
survival value. In Michael and Becker's (1973) words, "if genetical natural 
selection and rational behavior reinforce each other in producing speedier and 
more efficient responses to changes in environment, perhaps that common 
preference function has evolved over time by natural selection and rational 
choice as thatpreference function best adopted to human society". 
4.2 .. Methodology and Becker's Approach 
Methodological disputes are deemed singularly unproductive in economics. 
Ever since the Methodenstreit between Karl Menger and Gustav Schmoller, the 
prejudice of the profession goes against wasting time on method. Becker has not 
I 
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made any overt pronouncements that we know of on these questions, but in 
practice he has profoundly transformed the way in which many economists look 
at how they should proceed in building their science. He can even be seen as 
innovative in relation to that luminary of the older Chicago School, Milton 
Friedman (Friedman, 1953). 
Friedman, Stigler and Becker, and other col!eagues, such as Schultz and 
Fogel, al! worked or are working within the general framework of Karl Popper's 
methodology (Popper, 1959): for these economists, hypothesizing is free, to the 
point even of being "counterfactual" if necessary; but theory has to be tested by 
comparing its predictions with observations. So far is clear. 
Sorne dross has accumulated around the views of Popper, which has 
obscured their understanding. One ·sort of confusion arises from Imre Lakatos' 
belief that a school of thought is characterized by a common "research program". 
Another kind of confusion arises from another idea of Lakatos', that a research 
program always has a hard core which none of the members ever question 
(Lakatos, 1976). 
Though Becker quite clearly conceives of economic research in the same 
Popperian spirit as Stigler or Friedman, it would be less than useful if al! three 
were presented as having the same research programo Al! tluee can be seen as 
fol!owers of Marshall, in their wish to solve practical problems using partial 
equilibriuin tools, or, to speak more accurately, assuming away sorne systemic or 
general equilibrium feedbacks to focus on observable causes. But their research 
programs must be seen as differing in quite fruilful ways: Becker's is to apply 
little-used tools, such as human capital, time preference, risk aversion, to explain 
widely dispersed social phenomena. 
Again Becker is the best refutation of the idea that Ihe older Chicago School 
defended a crystallized citadel of first principies which Ihey never questioned. 
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One can observe Becker moving away from the principie that "tastes must not be 
caviled at", to endogenizing preferences and modeling them along the same lines 
that apply to individual consumption or savings, or to a firm's production. 
As Popper maintained, each scientist, even though belonging to a school, can 
have her or his own research program, or a number of them along the years; and 
no assumption or theoretical axiom need be immunized from criticism and 
revision. 
Becker can be observed at present as receiving the influence of the new 
Chicago School, as he does not seem content with the comparative statics of his 
early years and is moving towards a more dynamic analysis, along the lines 
suggested by the new cIassical economics of Lucas, Sargent and Barro. 
5. ConcIusions 
Things need not be what they appear to be. The economist should go 
beyond surface in order to acquire a better knowledge of human behavior. This 
seems to be Becker's implicit proposal for the profession. Becker's share of this 
task has been remarkably fulfilled by bringing production and investment theory 
into consumer theory. Since Becker's reformulalion of the theory of consumer 
behavior, households are no longer seen as passive consumers. Becker's work 
has shed light upon the black box view of Ihe household enabling us to see them 
not only as utility maximizers but also as rational producers and investors. Now, 
households are producers of basic goods, investors in themselves, in their human 
capital, and investors in their own children. They also have to make decisions 
about their marital status (remaining single, marrying or divorcing), not taken as 
given any more, and about the subsequent home division oi labor between their 
members. The additional structure Becker gives to households means that aspects 
of households behavior traditionally attributed to exogenous factors in 
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conventional theory (usually differences in lastes or shifts in preferences) can 
now be endogenized and related to differences in prices and incomes. 
Becker's economics differs from traditional economics in two fundamental 
respects: scope and approach. Economic theory is a much more powerful tool 
than noneconomists and even professional economists tend to think. Economics 
is not only the science of explicit markets and prices. Economics is a way of 
thinking. A whole world of nonmarket activities is waiting to be fruitfully 
analyzed by applying economic tools. The economic theory of marriage, fertility, 
criminal and political behavior are outstanding examples of this imperialistic 
view of economics, in which Becker has beco me a leading figure. Armed with the 
postulates of stable preferences, maximizing behavior and market equilibrium, the 
economist can offer new insights into areas not traditionally viewed as the 
province of economics. More often than not, these insights are, it is worth 
emphasizing, at variance with casual observation, conventional wisdom or 
established propositions from other sciences. Thus, babies are nor inferior goods, 
criminals are not passive victims of society, full sharing of household tasks 
between husbands and wives is not an efficient arrangement, capitalists do not 
gain by discriminating against black workers, marriage is not simply a matter of 
physical attraction, or cultural or institutional factors, divorce is largely 
independent of divorce laws, and so on. 
These considerations capture, we believe, the essence of Becker. 
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